Abstract
Reading these three papers devoted to my Representation and Reality, I had a very strange experience: not one of my three distinguished colleagues got me substantially wrong! In the past, whenever I have been asked to write comments on papers about my views, at least fifty percent of my effort has had to go into correcting misunderstandings. In this case, that effort can happily be saved, and I can devote myself to the much more pleasant task of taking up the arguments and the challenges of Dick Rorty, Paul Churchland and Christopher Peacocke. None of those challenges is directed against my criticisms of functionalism, which took up the major part of Representation and Reality, but they are highly important nonetheless, dealing, as they do, with the philosophical morals that I drew from the failure of functionalism; and Rorty's and Churchland's essays both deal, at least in part, with the central philosophical-logical issue of truth.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callSimilar Papers
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
