Abstract
In this paper, we propose a trustworthy friendly jammer selection scheme with truth-telling for wireless cooperative systems. We first utilize the reverse auction scheme to enforce truth-telling as the dominant strategy for each candidate friendly jammer. Specifically, we consider two auction cases: (1) constant power (CP) case and (2) the utility of the BS maximization (UBM) case. In both cases, the reverse auction scheme enforces truth-telling as the dominant strategy. Next, we introduce the trust category and trust degree to evaluate the trustworthiness of each Helper transmitter (Helper-Tx). Specifically, an edge controller calculates the reputation value of each Helper-Tx periodically using an additive-increase multiplicative-decrease algorithm by observing its jamming behavior. With the historical reputation values, the edge controller (EC) classifies a Helper-Tx into one of four trust categories and calculates its trust degree. Then, the EC selects the best Helper-Tx based on the trust category and trust degree. Lastly, we present numerical results to demonstrate the performance of our proposed jammer selection scheme.
Highlights
Cooperative jamming enables two wireless nodes to exchange secret messages in the presence of an eavesdropper without encryption [1, 2]
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: (i) We prove that the base station (BS) can achieve the highest secrecy rate by selecting a one best Helper-Tx as the jammer
This paper presents a trustworthy friendly jammer selection scheme with truth-telling for wireless cooperative system (WCS)
Summary
Cooperative jamming enables two wireless nodes to exchange secret messages in the presence of an eavesdropper without encryption [1, 2]. To address the aforementioned challenges, we propose a trustworthy friendly jammer selection scheme with truth-. We utilize the reverse auction scheme to enforce truth-telling under two cases: (1) constant power (CP) case and (2) utility of the BS maximization (UBM) case. More than one jammer can lead to a decreased secrecy performance (ii) We utilize the reverse auction scheme to stimulate truth-telling of Helper-Txs. In the reverse auction scheme, we consider two cases: (1) CP case and (2) UBM case. The reverse auction scheme can guarantee incentive compatible (IC) and individual rationality (IR) In both cases, we show numerical results that the reverse auction scheme outperforms the widely used Vickrey auction scheme (iii) We propose two metrics (i.e., trust category and degree) to measure the trustworthiness of a selected jammer. A ± 0 (A ≻ 0) means that A is a Hermitian positive semidefinite (definite) matrix
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