Abstract
Using a nationally representative sample of 1052 respondents from the United Kingdom, we systematically tested the associations between the experimental trust game and a range of popular self-reported measures for trust, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the Rosenberg scale for self-reported trust. We find that, in our UK representative sample, the experimental trust game significantly and positively predicts generalised self-reported trust in the GSS. This association is robust across a number of alternative empirical specifications, which account for multiple hypotheses corrections and control for other social preferences as measured by the dictator game and the public good game, as well as for a broad range of individual characteristics, such as gender, age, education, and personal income. We discuss how these results generalise to nationally representative samples from six other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (France, Germany, Italy, Korea, Slovenia, and the US).
Highlights
Using a nationally representative sample of 1052 respondents from the United Kingdom, we systematically tested the associations between the experimental trust game and a range of popular self-reported measures for trust, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the Rosenberg scale for self-reported trust
We review in greater detail these studies but their main findings are as follows: whilst some studies find that the experimental trust and trustworthiness measured in the trust game can predict some field behaviours, the evidence is much more mixed and contradictory for predicting survey questions on self-reported trust or trustworthiness
We add a variety of robustness checks in our estimates, including alternative empirical specifications controlling for a broad range of individual characteristics, as well as a replication of our results using nationally representative samples of six other OECD
Summary
Experimental games such as the trust game (Berg et al [1]) have been extensively used by behavioral economists to elicit key social preferences, such as trust and trustworthiness. In the classic trust game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (BDM [1]), two participants are randomly matched, and one acts as sender while the other one acts as receiver. Both are initially endowed with £10, and the sender decides the amount to send to the receiver,. We review in greater detail these studies, but their main findings are as follows: whilst some studies find that the experimental trust and trustworthiness measured in the trust game can predict some field behaviours, the evidence is much more mixed and contradictory for predicting survey questions on self-reported trust or trustworthiness.
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