Trustee strategies, politicization and de‐delegation: The case of the European Central Bank

Abstract

AbstractThis article shows how the European Central Bank (ECB) reduced the risk of politicization and de facto de‐delegation despite experiencing contestation. During the euro area crisis and the coronavirus emergency the ECB's monetary policy measures have been widely praised for their effectiveness. Even though the ECB is an independent trustee that cannot be easily sanctioned, it needs to engage with its principals to receive their political backing for common projects and in order to reaffirm its own centrality in governance. This article identifies different trustee strategies to reduce politicization and thereby to decrease the risk of de facto de‐delegation: (i) dualism, (ii) voluntary self‐restraint, and (iii) changing the yard stick. It concludes by showing that the ECB has expanded its monetary policy toolbox without triggering neither formal nor de facto de‐delegation.