Abstract
Discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols are promising candidates for large-scale deployment due to the large technological overlap with deployed modern optical communication devices. The security of discrete modulation schemes has previously analyzed in the ideal detector scenario in the asymptotic limit. In this work, we calculate asymptotic key rates against collective attacks in the trusted detector noise scenario. Our results show that we can thus cut out most of the effect of detector noise and obtain asymptotic key rates similar to those had we access to ideal detectors.
Highlights
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2] is a key establishment protocol with the provable information-theoretic security
We remark that Gaussian modulation schemes have been analyzed in the trusted detector noise scenario [11,32,33,34] and it is known that the effects of electronic noise and detector inefficiency on the key rates are not very significant in the trusted detector noise scenario compared to the ideal detector scenario under realistic experimental conditions
We provide a method to analyze the asymptotic security of a discrete modulation scheme of CVQKD in the trusted detector noise scenario where both nonunity detector efficiency and electronic noise are trusted
Summary
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2] is a key establishment protocol with the provable information-theoretic security. We extend our previous analysis [31] to the trusted detector noise scenario where detector imperfections (detector inefficiency and electronic noise) are not accessible to Eve. We remark that Gaussian modulation schemes have been analyzed in the trusted detector noise scenario [11,32,33,34] and it is known that the effects of electronic noise and detector inefficiency on the key rates are not very significant in the trusted detector noise scenario compared to the ideal detector scenario under realistic experimental conditions. In our analysis, based on a (commonly used) quantum optical model of the imperfect detector, we find its corresponding mathematical description in terms of positive operator-valued measure (POVM) and use this POVM to construct observables corresponding to quantities that are measured experimentally These observables are used in our security proof.
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