Trust, Information and Pre-contractual Liability

Abstract

Abstract This article explores on two ‘strangers’ for contract law – even though, at second sight, they both would seem truly seminal to contract law. This is, on the one hand, investment advice and more generally (pre-)contractual relationships on the giving of information in capital markets – arguably the largest market and contract segment in developed market economies, or at least one of the largest, but typically rather discussed only in specialised circles. This is, on the other hand, a broad pluralist interdisciplinary theory on trust in its relationship to information – largely underexplored and even missing in parts, even though absolutely core for all trust elements in contracts. There are not few of them. The core argument is that, if sociological, ethical and philosophical approaches are included, the outcome is grossly different from what ensues from the reference to the findings of institutional economics – so far dominant at least in financial services contracts. This is true namely for the desirable design of information, for the focus on specific groups of addressees and as well for the (traditionally rather high) prerequisites of pre-contractual liability.