Abstract
The question of whether a process variable transmitted from a device in the field to a power system control center is trustworthy is of high importance nowadays. Traditional bad data detection schemes have their limits in cases of elaborated cyberattacks and cascading failures in a system of systems such as a digitalized power system. This paper proposes a trust model designed for power system network assessment (PSNA). Different to other domains, where trust models already exist (e.g., OC-Trust for organic computing systems), the environment for PSNA is more centralized, and the focus lies on other facets than in organic computing due to the nature of the environment. Therefore, OC-Trust is tailored by categorizing its facets regarding their relevance for PSNA on the one hand. On the other hand, the trust model is extended to realize context-sensitive intersections of trust values. Furthermore, an example of an instantiation of the resulting PSNA-Trust model is given. Two security metrics and one credibility metric based on literature are presented as well as an equation for a context-sensitive intersection.
Highlights
The main task of a power system operator is to maintain the system in a normal, secure state as the operating conditions vary during the daily operation
This paper proposes a trust model designed for power system network assessment (PSNA)
Different to other domains, where trust models already exist (e.g., OC-Trust for organic computing systems), the environment for PSNA is more centralized, and the focus lies on other facets than in organic computing due to the nature of the environment
Summary
The main task of a power system operator is to maintain the system in a normal, secure state as the operating conditions vary during the daily operation. Liu et al [3, 4] started in 2009 to investigate false data injection attacks (FDIAs) on a state estimator. With the increase of complexity of power systems, the need for state estimation in all subsystems increases, too [10]. In such subsystems, data identified as compromised would need to be replaced (e.g., by simulated data). The multi-faceted concept fits very well the different kinds of threats to trust in SCADA process variables described above.
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