Abstract

At the core of environmental-economic disputes is an inherent distrust of “the other side.” This article draws on past research to identify factors that contribute to and exacerbate these negative expectations. Contextual features of these negotiations—including uncertainty, power asymmetries, and standard and surveillance systems—are argued to produce construal discrepancies and thus to act as generators of distrust and expectations of unethical behavior. In turn, these negative expectations and actions decrease the likelihood that optimal agreements will be formed. Recommendations directed toward improving the resulting hostile atmosphere are provided.

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