Abstract
High and low scorers on Rotter's measure of interpersonal trust were provided with opportunities to communicate noncontingent promises of cooperation to a target in the context of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. The target always reciprocated the subjects' promises and either always kept the promises or never did. There was a tendency for 20 students high in trust to be more exploitative in their first use of promises than 20 low scorers, but the situational factor of target credibility had much stronger behavioral effects. Subjects sent more promises and kept them more often when the target was credible than when she was not. Parallel impressions of the target were induced by both dispositional and situational factors.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
