Trust and the Governance of Higher Education: The Introduction of Chancellor System in Hungarian Higher Education

Gergely Kováts

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-77407-7_39

Abstract

Trust plays a vital role in the cooperation of social actors. While researching trust becomes important in public management, the impact of trust on higher education policy and management has drawn less attention. This chapter analyses the introduction of the chancellor system in Hungarian higher education from the perspective of trust. In this new governance model, chancellors, who are appointed by the government, became responsible for the administration and budgets of higher institutions (HEIs), while rectors kept their prerogatives only on academic issues. The success of an institution now depends on the cooperation of its two interdependent leaders. Trust plays an especially critical role in such leadership constellation. The study is based on empirical data collected through two surveys conducted in 2015 and 2016 among academic leaders of Hungarian higher education institutions and uses Hurley’s decision-to-trust-model (Hurley 2012) as an analytic framework.

Highlights

Researching Trust in Higher EducationSince the 1980s, most European higher education systems are in a state of permanent reform
In Germany, for example, where the chancellor position exists, it is differently defined, all major stakeholders are involved in the selection of chancellors (Table 8)
In that case, creating low-risk mechanisms for institutions to voice their concerns regarding the activity of the chancellor is important to counterbalance asymmetrical power relations

Summary

Introduction

Researching Trust in Higher EducationSince the 1980s, most European higher education systems are in a state of permanent reform. Developing a personal connection with the rector (and with other academic leaders) helps the development of shared visions. There are other possibilities to increase trust toward chancellors. By involving institutions in the selection of chancellors, HEIs have more means to balance asymmetric power relationships and to retaliate opportunistic behaviour.

Results

Conclusion