Trust and Distributive Justice in John Locke's Politics of Money

Lee Ward

doi:10.1017/s0034670521000450

Abstract

AbstractModern commentators tend to view John Locke's theory of money either in terms of a process of naturalization placing currency completely beyond the realm of politics or as an effort to provide a moral foundation for a convention subject to epistemic instability. This study builds on the latter interpretation but offers an alternative to the standard view that Locke sought to remove monetary policy from the scope of ongoing political deliberation. While Locke emphasized the concept of trust necessary for the networks of credit and economic exchange, his account of money also prioritized prudential judgments and distinct discursive contexts, especially relating to distributive justice. Locke's economic tracts give reason to reconsider his putative role as founder of the “sound money” doctrine and shed light on aspects of his statecraft only partly visible in his more familiar political works.

Highlights

THE REVIEW OF POLITICSSeveral commentators claim that Locke’s reasoning with respect to money is driven by his deep anxiety about the inherent epistemic instability in mixed modes, especially as currency denominations are subject to the problem of disagreement about the meaning of language.22
John Locke’s role in the development of early modern thinking about money is well established
Modern commentators tend to view John Locke’s theory of money either in terms of a process of naturalization placing currency completely beyond the realm of politics or as an effort to provide a moral foundation for a convention subject to epistemic instability

Summary

THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

Several commentators claim that Locke’s reasoning with respect to money is driven by his deep anxiety about the inherent epistemic instability in mixed modes, especially as currency denominations are subject to the problem of disagreement about the meaning of language.22 This line of argument risks losing some of the original texture of Locke’s epistemology, for he insisted in the Essay that substance is more difficult to understand than mixed modes. The alteration in the “intrinsic value of things” is produced when “by mutual consent” people agreed to place value on some “lasting thing” such as a “little piece of yellow metal” that could be used to exchange for the “truly useful, but perishable” supports of life (II 37, 47) In his discussion of land, which he calls the “chief matter of property,” Locke contends that one acre of uncultivated land in precolonial America and another in monetarized England have “the same natural intrinsic value,” and yet one benefits humankind much more owing to the productive capacities unleashed by money (II 32, 43).

The Natural Price of Money

The Recoinage Controversy

Conclusion