Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea

Abstract

Although historians have devoted considerable attention in recent years to Harry S. Truman's foreign policy, one incident has escaped significant controversy. Few writers challenge the conclusion that Truman's decision to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and seek forcible reunification of the Korean peninsula was ill-considered and disastrous. American military operations north of the parallel constituted a clear escalation of hostilities and prompted Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict. Subsequently, American involvement in the prolonged and costly military stalemate undermined Truman's leadership both at home and abroad. Some scholars have argued that Truman's primary motive for ordering American combat forces across the thirty-eighth parallel was political gain. Popular happiness over Korean reunification would increase sharply the popularity of the Democratic party and lead to a sweep of the 1950 midterm congressional elections.' Domestic politics may have been an important consideration, but Truman ultimately decided to cross the thirty-eighth parallel because he believed that the reunification of Korea would inflict a momentous defeat on the strategy of Soviet expansion. Once the United States destroyed the North Korean army, the administration was confident that a united Korea would reject the communist model for national development. In crossing the parallel, Truman sought to guarantee for all Koreans the right of national self-determination. Truman's decision to cross the thirty-eighth parallel was in large part the outgrowth of past policy. Ever since the Cairo Conference in December 1943, Washington's objective in Korea had been the creation of an independent,