True versus strategic fairness in a common resource dilemma: Evidence from the dual‐process perspective

Abstract

AbstractCommon resource dilemmas involve collectively coordinating individual choices to promote group efficiency. Equal division represents one of the most important coordination rules. Previous research suggests that individuals follow the equality rule for different reasons. Some individuals behave cooperatively out of their concern for other's welfare, whereas some individuals cooperate strategically to enhance personal gains. Building on the dual‐process perspective, the authors aim to differentiate strategic fairness from true fairness in solving a resource dilemma. In four experiments, the effect of cognitive processing manipulations on individual harvesting behavior in a one‐shot resource dilemma was tested against participants with different social values. Results consistently showed that prosocials, who value joint outcome and equality, requested significantly less money than did proselfs, who value personal gain. More importantly, prosocials in the intuition and deliberation conditions request similar amounts, whereas proselfs in the intuition condition request more money than those in the deliberation condition. The results were further validated by a follow‐up meta‐analysis based on the four experiments. The implications of the dual‐process perspective for social coordination research are discussed.