Abstract
According to the subjective view of lying, speakers can lie by asserting a true proposition, as long as they believe this proposition to be false. This view contrasts with the objective view, according to which lying requires the actual falsity of the proposition asserted. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to pairs of assertions that differ only in intuitively redundant content and to show that such pairs of assertions are a reason to favour the subjective view of lying over the objective one.
Highlights
Does lying require falsity? According to the traditional definition of lying accepted by many philosophers, only believed falsity matters: A lies to B if and only if there is a proposition p such that: (L1) A asserts p to B, and. (L2) A believes that p is false
The traditional definition entails a subjective view of lying, on which a speaker can lie by asserting a true proposition, as long as the speaker believes that the
We have argued for the subjective view of lying and against the objective view of lying by considering pairs of assertions, where a speaker either asserts only p or redundantly adds to this assertion that he believes p/does not believe not-p
Summary
Does lying require falsity? According to the traditional definition of lying accepted by many philosophers, only believed falsity matters:. The traditional definition entails a subjective view of lying, on which a speaker can lie by asserting a true proposition, as long as the speaker believes that the. Several theorists have attacked this view and have argued for an objective view of lying, according to which lying does require the actual falsity of the proposition asserted. Many authors have argued for one of the aforementioned views by presenting cases involving a discrepancy between believed and actual falsity and reporting their own intuitions about these cases.. We would like to offer an argument for the subjective view of lying that is neither based on intuitions about individual cases, nor on empirical studies, but rather on intuitions about a class of pairs of assertions, where the first and the second assertion in each pair differ only in redundant content. As the subjective view does not lead to problematic predictions, intuitions about these pairs of assertions speak against the objective view
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