True Alethic Functionalism?

Abstract

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes I am grateful to Jens Christian Bjerring, Doug Edwards, Michael Lynch, and Crispin Wright for helpful discussion. 1 Notational convention: I use capitals for concepts. 2 TOM, pp. 8, 10, 12. In TOM, Objectivity and End of Inquiry are stated in terms of beliefs, while Norm of Belief is formulated in terms of propositions – which Lynch takes to be the primary truth-bearer (TOM: pp. 129–32). It should also be noted that Lynch states Objectivity and Norm of Belief as schemas while End of Inquiry has the form of a universal generalizations. The regimented formulation of (O), (NB), and (EI) is adopted from David (forthcoming David, M. (forthcoming, 2012) ‘Lynch’s Functionalist Theory of Truth’, in N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds) Truth Pluralism: Current Debates, New York: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], 2012). 3 Lynch’s notion of superwarrant is modeled on Wright’s notion of superassertibility, which in turn is a generalization of the notion of truth as it figures in mathematical intuitionism. For further details, cf. TOM: Ch. 2, and Wright, 1992 Wright, C. 1992. Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 2003 Wright, C. 2003. ‘Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed’, in Saving the Differences, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Google Scholar]. 4 The domain conjuncts of (TG) will be omitted in the sequel for ease of exposition. For more on (TG), see Pedersen, 2006 Pedersen, N. J. L. L. 2006. What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism?. The Monist, 89(1): 103–117. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2010 Pedersen, N. J. L. L. 2010. Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism. Philosophical Quarterly, 60(238): 92–108. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], and Pedersen and Wright (forthcoming Pedersen, N. J. L. L. and C. D. Wright (forthcoming, 2012) ‘Pluralism about Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism’, in N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds) Truth Pluralism: Current Debates, New York: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], 2012). 5 I spell out the arguments in full in Appendix A of Pedersen and Wright (forthcoming Wright, C. (forthcoming, 2012) ‘A Plurality of Pluralisms?’, in N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds) Truth Pluralism: Current Debates, New York: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], 2012). 6 See Williamson, 1994 Williamson, T. (1994) ‘Critical, Study of Truth and Objectivity’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2(1): 130–144. [Google Scholar], and Tappolet, 2000 Tappolet, C. 2000. Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logics: A Reply to Beall. Philosophical Quarterly, 50(200): 383–385. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], for earlier presentations of the problem. 7 For a sample of contributions, see Edwards, 2008 Edwards, D. 2008. Truth-conditions and the Nature of Truth. Analysis, 68: 143–149. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] and 2009 Edwards, D. 2009. Truth-conditions and the Nature of Truth. Analysis, 69: 684–688. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Cotnoir, 2009 Cotnoir, A. 2009. Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions: Some Alternatives. Analysis, 69(3): 473–479. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Lynch, 2004 Lynch, M. 2004. Truth and Multiple Realizability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(3): 384–408. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] and 2009 Lynch, M. 2009. Truth as One and Many, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: 86–91; Pedersen (n.d.), and Wright (forthcoming Wright, C. (forthcoming, 2012) ‘A Plurality of Pluralisms?’, in N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds) Truth Pluralism: Current Debates, New York: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], 2012). 8 As highlighted in Section 2, Lynch takes Objectivity, Norm of Belief, and End of Inquiry to be core truisms. One way to attempt a functionalist response to the point just raised would be to add a ‘no problem of mixed compounds’ truism and take it to be characteristic of truth in the same way that Objectivity, Norm of Belief, and End of Inquiry are. This would immediately raise the question what precisely such a truism would look like. Would it, e.g., explicitly mention the problem of mixed compounds? Letting it do so would probably not be a promising path to take. For the truisms are meant to be principles accepted at least tacitly by ordinary folk (or philosophical refinements of such principles), and presumably, ordinary folk do not accept principles pertaining to the problem of mixed compounds, not even tacitly. But then we are just back at the initial question: what would the relevant truism look like?