Troubles with Actualism

Abstract

Actualism, as we shall understand it here, is minimally the view that there are no objects that do not actually exist.1 Shifting emphasis slightly, it is the view that there are no philosophical problems whose solution calls for or requires an ontological commitment to non-actual objects. Relative to this characterization, our aim in the present essay is to pose a challenge to the actualist's ontological stance, to test the actualist's ability to deal with several apparently straightforward examples. We confine our attention to three problem cases. Case One. Jones, we may suppose, has recently taken up nouvelle cuisine with its laudable emphasis on fresh and unusual ingredients. One weekend, in seclusion, he opts to prepare for himself the remarkable squab salad with wild mushrooms and quail eggs concocted by Jean Banchet for his renowned restaurant Le FranCais. For his preparation, Jones decides, why not utilize wild mushrooms he gathered from the nearby woods yesterday? A splendid creation, he observes upon dining. But alas, some time later Jones, still home alone and many miles from the nearest person, is rendered comatose. Several of the wild mushrooms were highly toxic and Jones, utterly alone and physically incapable of conveying his plight and summoning emergency treatment, faces certain death. In this situation it seems clear that both (1) and (2) are true.