Troubled semi-presidentialism: stability of the constitutional system and cabinet in Ukraine

Abstract

THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK is at the heart of the complex political transition experienced by the former Soviet republics during the first post-communist decade. Ukraine, like many other countries in the region, has opted for a semi-presidential constitutional model. As several scholars have already pointed out, both negotiating several constitutional arrangements and practising the norms prescribed by these arrangements proved to be difficult. The first post-communist decade in Ukraine was plagued with numerous conflicts among branches of government, political polarisation and dangerous challenges to democratic legitimacy. While constitutional debates about the underlying institutional framework in most of the countries in the post-communist region have already settled down, allowing politicians to turn to everyday political issues, the debates about the basic issues of government organisation in Ukraine are as topical as ever. Some of the major political parties persistently question the rationality of principles that guide the separation of powers in Ukraine. Both parliamentary factions and individual deputies have repeatedly mounted attacks on the existing constitutional system, proposing radical amendments to the 1996 constitution. And finally, the incumbent president, whose second term in office is about to expire in 2004 and whose chances of securing the election of a favoured successor are slim, declared to the surprise of many observers that the constitutional provisions guiding the separation of powers in Ukraine had to be changed. This article examines how the choice of this constitutional model affects both the relationship among key institutional actors and the prospects of institutional change. It starts by analysing the character of the relationship between the president and parliament in the context of their competition over control of the cabinet. While the issue of constitutional system stability is more fundamental than the problem of cabinet stability, I start with the latter because understanding the conflict over cabinet formation and the cabinet’s stay in office allows illumination of the principal lines of institutional rivalry in the Ukrainian political system. I then proceed by examining how the institutional interests and preferences of key political actors who inhabit the presidency, the legislature and the cabinet affect the prospects of maintaining or changing the constitutional status quo in Ukraine.