Abstract

At the end of the war against Japan in South East Asia, as Supreme Allied Commander, Mountbatten faced problems as difficult as any during the war: evacuating over three-quarters of a million enemy troops, rescuing prisoners of war and internees, and restoring law and order. The first two were difficult enough, given the vast size of the country and the inadequate forces available; the third brought him into conflict with the emerging nationalist movements and with the returning colonial powers. Lacking clear guidance from London, Mountbatten and his commanders on the spot largely shaped their own policy, and if the final outcome was not all that Mountbatten later implied, neither was it the disastrous result of ill-conceived military interference that some critics have claimed. This book describes Mountbatten's problems, the strategies used to overcome them and the achievements that finally wound up the war in South East Asia.

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