Trojan horses: Putnam, ECU linkage and the EU ambitions of Nordic elites

Abstract

This article argues that the decision by Nordic elites to link their respective currencies to an ECU basket is consistent with a Trojan horse strategy for membership in the European Union. After alternative explanations for ECU linkage are tested, the article shows how Nordic elites used their control over exchange rate regime choices to facilitate greater EU participation, in spite of the hesitancy voiced by domestic constituents. In order to make the argument, Putnam's two-level metaphor is amended to accommodate a bargaining situation where negotiators have independent policy preferences. This amended model provides seven lessons for negotiators willing to manipulate win-set contours with an eye toward affecting public support. These lessons are then juxtaposed with the Nordic decisions to link their currencies to an ECU basket. The article concludes that ECU linkage can be explained in terms of, and is consistent with, a strategy based on the EU ambitions of Nordic political elites.