Abstract
An initialization input attack on a set of two pseudo-random generators using analog-digital hardware Trojan is presented in this paper. Trojan circuit implementations are discussed following their full classification. Simulation results confirming the effectiveness of the Trojan impact on a repetition of identical seed values are analyzed. Trojan structure is integrated with the deterministic random bit generator functional model recommended by NIST and the task is to impact two seed generators (in two channels), which use the independent Chua circuits as the sources of entropy. The analog Trojan part causes synchronization of the two analog chaotic circuits as explained by the results of LTSpice simulation. The digital Trojan part controls the analog part and modifies the values of optional parameters used in the creation of the seeds. The seed value creation in two cases (with and without Trojan) are simulated by using Xilinx ISIM.
Highlights
H ARDWARE random generators are often designed as a combination of two sub-generators, the true-random, or TRBG, with slow dynamics, and the pseudo-random, or PRBG, with high speed [1]
In research on hardware security and trust, the presence of hardware Trojans is quite often only limited to integrated circuits, ignoring the possibility of hacking attacks at the highest level of abstraction that printed circuit boards (PCBs) are for microelectronic systems [11]- [13]
AN INPUT ATTACK ON FUNCTIONAL MODEL OF A DETERMINISTIC RANDOM BIT GENERATOR As shown in [1], analog chaotic circuits with slow dynamics occupy a minimal area of PCB and the randomness of their generated values was confirmed by a set of National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) tests
Summary
H ARDWARE random generators are often designed as a combination of two sub-generators, the true-random, or TRBG, with slow dynamics, and the pseudo-random, or PRBG, with high speed [1]. Reducing the costs of designing and implementing microelectronic systems requires various design compromises For security modules, such compromises are the use of pseudo-random generators instead of commercial quantum ones. A variety of random values is ensured by their initialization with seed values from the low cost and easy to built independent entropy sources. The hacker is able to get the information about which communication interface pins should be soldered to the external modification chip device, in order to extract the sensitive data Such attacks make it necessary to investigate whether the entropy sources (being often analog circuits) exposed to an easy access to their circuit structure can cause a threat in the process of forming seed values. According to the authors’ knowledge, no attack in which a synchronization between two independent entropy sources occurs because of a hardware Trojan, has been described in the literature.
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