Abstract
Opponents of the computational theory of mind (CTM) have held that the theory is devoid of explanatory content, since whatever computational procedures are said to account for our cognitive attributes will also be realized by a host of other ‘deviant’ physical systems, such as buckets of water and possibly even stones. Such ‘triviality’ claims rely on a simple mapping account (SMA) of physical implementation. Hence defenders of CTM traditionally attempt to block the trivialization critique by advocating additional constraints on the implementation relation. However, instead of attempting to ‘save’ CTM by constraining the account of physical implementation, I argue that the general form of the triviality argument is invalid. I provide a counterexample scenario, and show that SMA is in fact consistent with empirically rich and theoretically plausible versions of CTM. This move requires rejection of the computational sufficiency thesis, which I argue is scientifically unjustified in any case. By shifting the ‘burden of explanatory force’ away from the concept of physical implementation, and instead placing it on salient aspects of the target phenomenon to be explained, it’s possible to retain a maximally liberal and unfettered view of physical implementation, and at the same time defuse the triviality arguments that have motivated defenders of CTM to impose various theory-laden constraints on SMA.
Highlights
According to the long standing and widely embraced (e.g. Putnam 1967; Fodor 1975; Newell and Simon 1976; Stich 1983; Pylyshyn 1984; Johnson-Laird 1988; Pinker 1997) computational theory of mind (CTM), computation is held to provide the scientific key to explaining the mind, and in1 3 Vol.:(0123456789)P
What simple mapping account (SMA) directly threatens, and what has served as the implicit fulcrum in the trivialization controversy, is not a technical paradigm wherein computation is deemed to provide the appropriate mathematical framework for a scientific study of the mind, just as, say, Hilbert Space is the appropriate mathematical framework for quantum mechanics, and 4-dimensional Minkowski geometry for special relativity
What is threatened is a very specific version of CTM which is committed to Computational Sufficiency Thesis (CST)
Summary
According to the long standing and widely embraced (e.g. Putnam 1967; Fodor 1975; Newell and Simon 1976; Stich 1983; Pylyshyn 1984; Johnson-Laird 1988; Pinker 1997) computational theory of mind (CTM), computation (of one sort or another) is held to provide the scientific key to explaining the mind, and in. This triviality critique is certainly not aimed at a Philosophical Straw Man, since a host of authors have responded, including Fodor (1981), Maudlin (1989), Chrisley (1994), Chalmers (1996), Copeland (1996), Scheutz (1999), Shagrir (2001), Godfrey-Smith (2009), Sprevak (2010), Milkowski (2013), Rescorla (2014), Piccinini (2015b), in an attempt to defend CTM These defences generally accept the basic supposition that an unbridled simple mapping account critically undermines the computational theory of mind, and they attempt to defend CTM by placing additional constraints on the implementation relation, so that it is no longer a simple or theoretically neutral mapping. I propose that a genuinely computational account of mentality should include a specification of the formal abstract state transitions mediating inputs and outputs
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.