Tristesse et mélancolie comme conséquence de la culpabilité : le Schuldigsein entre les phénoménologie et psychanalyse

Abstract

ObjectiveThis article aims to demonstrate the relevance of the concept of guilt in understanding the depressive syndrome, particularly in melancholic psychosis, in the phenomenological and psychoanalytic approaches to psychopathology. It does so by comparing Lacan's and Heidegger's approaches to subjectivity and existence. MethodThrough a bibliographic and conceptual analysis of the notions of guilt and melancholy in the phenomenological and psychoanalytic traditions, and using two clinical vignettes from the scientific literature, we highlight the significance of the concept of guilt in understanding melancholic psychosis. ResultThere is a possible parallel between Lacanian psychoanalysis and Heidegger's Daseinanalysis on the concept of guilt. It can be interpreted as the expression of the rejection of the unconscious but also as an expression of authentic existential projectuality of Dasein. This opens up several conceptual and methodological questions at the theoretical and clinical levels. DiscussionGuilt could then be a clinical indicator of the subject's rejection of the unconscious, which in melancholic psychosis manifests as a totalizing identification with the waste-object, without other existential possibilities, without “lack.” From the perspective of existential analysis, the abnormal guilt of the melancholic could thus be understood as a form of foreclosure of Being. ConclusionGuilt in psychopathology can vary depending on the specific subjective conditions observed in clinical settings. In the case of melancholy, guilt is an indicator of the stagnation of the subject in relation to their existential possibilities. The existential inertia of the melancholic can be interpreted as a very current ontology of waste.