Abstract
The operation and maintenance sectors of electric multiple unit (EMU) are considered as game participants to optimize the preventive maintenance (PM) schedule of EMU components. The total cost of a component over a life cycle includes failure risk and maintenance cost. The failure risk of EMU components is assessed quantitatively by using an analytic hierarchy process and scoring and weighting the factors that affect the failure risk of such components. The operation sector expects failure risk to be minimized, whereas the maintenance sector expects maintenance costs to be low, and their interests interfere with each other to some extent. This study establishes a tristage bargaining dynamic game model of the operation sector priority bid and maintenance sector priority bid considering the PM reliability threshold R as the bargaining object. A numerical example demonstrates that the result is more beneficial to the sector that bids first, and the operation priority bid allows the component to maintain a higher reliability level over a life cycle, especially in the latter half of the component life cycle.
Highlights
Cost and interest allocation problems arise in many real-life situations [1, 2], where individuals, who may have different purposes, decide to work together
Based on the tristage bargaining dynamic game model under symmetric information, considering the electric multiple unit (EMU) operation and maintenance sectors as game participants, we develop a tristage bargaining dynamic game model to obtain the preventive maintenance (PM) schedule of the EMU component. e following assumptions are made for the model: (1) e initial component reliability is “1.”
Conclusion e PM schedule of the EMU component is jointly developed by the maintenance and operation sectors. is study established a tristage bargaining dynamic game model between these EMU sectors to balance the allocation of resources between them. e numerical example shows that operation sector priority bid allows components to maintain a higher level of reliability during a life cycle, especially in the latter half of the component life cycle, and its failure probability is reduced by nearly 1/ 6 than that under maintenance sector priority bid
Summary
Cost and interest allocation problems arise in many real-life situations [1, 2], where individuals, who may have different purposes, decide to work together. With regard to the operation and maintenance sectors of EMU, owing to their respective interests, they present a potential competitive relationship. The lower the PM reliability threshold R is, the fewer PM measures will be carried out, the lower the maintenance cost will be, and the more failure times and risks will be. Both maintenance sector and operation sector want the EMU to operate safely and smoothly, and they have some common interests to some extent. (5) Different imperfect PM measures consistently restore the performance of nonfailure components
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
