Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Power Generation Enterprises’ Green Transformation under the Responsibility Assessment of Renewable Energy Consumption in China

Abstract

Under the requirements of a low carbon economy, promoting the transition of energy consumption of power generation enterprises from fossil energy to renewable energy is essential in practicing carbon emission reduction. Taking China as an example, this study investigates the impact of the interactive behavior of central and local governments in fulfilling their green obligations on the green transformation of power generation enterprises by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model. The main findings of this paper are as follows: (i) Under the trend of reducing subsidies for renewable electricity, if local governments fail to fulfill their regulatory obligations for renewable energy consumption on time, it will discourage power generation enterprises from using renewable electricity; in the short term, it will cause power generation enterprises to turn their backs on green power strategy and choose thermal power strategy. (ii) If the central government releases a strong signal of a considerable amount of renewable energy power subsidy, the local government’s enthusiasm for fulfilling the renewable energy consumption supervision obligations will be hurt. (iii) The practical implementation of the responsibility assessment system of renewable energy consumption requires mobilizing all relevant stakeholders in the renewable energy market. It is essential to motivate local governments to fulfill their renewable energy consumption regulation obligation. This study provides a policy analysis for the green transformation of Chinese power generation enterprises and a reference for the green transformation of enterprises in other developing countries.