Tripartite evolutionary game and simulation analysis of electric bus charging facility sharing under the governmental reward and punishment mechanism

Abstract

Electric vehicles (EVs) are environmentally friendly with the features of low noise levels and zero tailpipe emissions. However, limited charging facilities have restricted the large-scale development of EVs, and electric bus charging facility sharing is a promising solution to this issue. While reducing charging time and improving facility utilization, this measure involves the interests of the government, bus operators, and electric car owners, requiring a systemic analysis of their interactions. Therefore, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model under the governmental reward and punishment mechanism. The model examines the strategic decision-making process, influential factors, and evolutionary stability of three players, followed by simulation analysis. The results show that: (1) The evolutionary system may exhibit three stable states: (0,0,0), (1,0,0) and (1,1,1), and enhance the initial ratio of the three stakeholders will help evolve towards the ideal state. (2) Increasing rewards and penalties can both be meaningful, when penalties exceed rewards, the measures can be more effective. (3) Bus operators are more sensitive to incentive and penalty measures than electric car owners, and governments should pay more attention to them in the implementation process. The findings can provide references for the policy formulation on electric bus charging facility sharing.