Abstract
With the rapid development of social media, Weibo rumors have increasingly attracted widespread attention. To maintain sustainable development of network ecology, it is necessary to clarify the evolution law of rumor propagation. First, evolutionary game model is applied to examine the interaction mechanisms of complex behaviors between Weibo rumor makers, Weibo users and governments in accordance with MA-PT (Mental Accounts and Prospect Theory). Next, the replication dynamic equation is used to solve the equilibrium strategy points of each player. It was found that the evolution game does not have a stable equilibrium point. Finally, we conduct empirical simulation to verify the model and primary conclusions. Results demonstrate that, 1) The reference value plays an important role in the strategic choices of players. 2) With the high value of psychological satisfaction of “Herding effect,” Weibo users choose to repost rumors. 3) Increasing the value of punishment, Weibo rumor makers are less likely to adopt the strategy of making rumors. 4) The higher loss of social unrest can encourage governments to adopt strict management strategies to maintain good online order. The results can guide governments to make better decisions in network governance.
Highlights
With the risen popularity of the Internet and the rapid development of social media, Internet rumors spread flooding in recent years [1]
This paper studies how to achieve the optimal governance of Weibo rumors, which can promote the healthy and sustainable development of the network and help the government put forward countermeasures and suggestions
Kim et al used the social network analysis method to study the relationship between network information dissemination and public opinion, and the results showed that the polarization of Weibo views was correlated with the form of political consciousness [54]
Summary
With the risen popularity of the Internet and the rapid development of social media, Internet rumors spread flooding in recent years [1]. In the process of rumor spreading, the government is the most effective regulator [18], whose intervention plays a critical role in behavior decisions of Weibo rumor makers and Weibo users. Scholars mainly combined the process of rumor spreading with epidemic propagation models for research. Under the premise of evolutionary game theory of bounded rationality and dynamic evolution, it is more consistent with the behavior rules and strategic choices of participants in Weibo rumor propagation. Kahneman put forward Prospect Theory from the psychological point of view [33] This theory can reasonably explain the different psychological perceptions of participants in the face of gains and losses, and can more accurately simulate the psychological characteristics of people in the decision-making process [34].
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