Tried and Tested? Dynastic Persistence and Legislative Productivity at the Philippine House of Representatives

Abstract

Examining the determinants of legislative success at the Philippine House of Representatives, this study shows empirically why continuous entrenchment by political families can be detrimental to political institutions. Using count regression models, the study analyzes the patterns of law production in the Philippine Lower House beginning from the opening of the first post‐Marcos Congress (8th Congress) in 1987 to the adjournment of the 15th Congress in 2013. The study finds that successive terms in office facilitate the ability of legislators to engage in legislative activities but only up to a point. Neophyte legislators who have yet to gain a foothold in their districts appear to be more proactive in concretizing proposals into actual legislation, at least initially. Over time, when legislative districts have become family turfs, incumbents cease to invest in vote courting activities such as legislation, lending credence to the unhealthy effect of political persistence on accountability.