Trick and treat: how the Commission and the European Parliament exert influence in EU foreign and security policies

Abstract

Studies suggest that the Commission and the European Parliament (EP) influence the Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP), despite it being formally an intergovernmental instrument. Few systematic attempts have been made to capture how the two institutions exert influence from an analytical perspective. This paper develops and explores a set of hypotheses (strategic coalition building, bargaining, community framing, circumvention and normative argumentation) in two cases: Naval mission Atalanta and the EU’s Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). We find that the Commission drew on its bargaining leverage, circumvented the member states and framed the issues at stake in a manner that increased its own competence. It is also in a better position to influence CFSP decisions at an early stage. The EP’s influence is bigger in the post-decision phase. One would, however, expect that the influence of the supranational institutions will increase as the CFSP moves towards a comprehensive approach.