Abstract
This work proposes authentication based on identity as a way to increase the efficiency and security of communications in vehicular ad-hoc networks. When using identity-based cryptography to achieve certificateless authentication, membership revocation is not a trivial problem. Thus, in order to improve the performance of revocation in such networks, the use of a dynamic authenticated data structure based on perfect k-ary hash trees combined with a duplex version of the new standard SHA-3 is here presented. Efficient algorithms in the used revocation trees allow reaching a refresh rate of at most simple updates per inserted node. Consequently, the proposal is especially useful for situations with frequent revocations, which are foreseeable when vehicular ad- hoc networks are widely deployed.
Highlights
Authentication is a crucial requirement for any communication network
This standard describes the use of Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), Certificate Authority (CA) and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and implies that in order to revoke a vehicle, a CRL has to be issued by the CA to the Road-Side Units (RSUs), who are in charge of sending this information to the On-Board Units (OBUs)
In this regard, when an OBU receives an “OK” message signed by a cheating RSU, it trusts it momentarily. When it contacts another RSU, it asks it again about the same pseudonym. If this RSU provides the OBU with a proof of revocation whose timestamp contradicts the “OK” answer signed by the questioned RSU, the OBU sends to the latter RSU an impeachment on the questioned RSU, so that the honest RSU can send it to the Trusted Third Party (TTP) who will revoke its public key by deleting it directly from the revoked RSU
Summary
Authentication is a crucial requirement for any communication network. On the one hand, an efficient way to authenticate legitimate and honest nodes is necessary. In order to use any public-key cryptosystem in practice, an efficient revocation mechanism is necessary because private keys may become compromised This problem has been solved through a centralized approach based on the existence of a Trusted Third Party (TTP), which is usually a CA distributing the so-called Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) that can be seen as blacklists of revoked certificates. Within the family of standards for vehicular communications IEEE 1609 based on the IEEE 802.11p, the standard 1609.2 deals in particular with the issues related to security services for applications and management messages This standard describes the use of PKIs, CAs and CRLs, and implies that in order to revoke a vehicle, a CRL has to be issued by the CA to the RSUs, who are in charge of sending this information to the OBUs. In particular, the IEEE 1609.2 standard proposes both broadcast authentication and non-repudiation through the use of the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
