Abstract
Another version of Kant's Categorical Imperative is the Formula of Humanity. This is investigated with regard to its treatment of the deontic relevance of motives. The portion of the formula prohibiting treating humanity merely as a means is shown to yield an implausibly subjective conception of deontic status. It is more plausible to take the essence of the Formula to be a requirement to treat rational agents as ends. The special meaning of ‘end’ is explored, and it is shown that it can support a largely objective conception of deontic status. The question of whether motives can ever be relevant deontically, given this interpretation, is then investigated. Evidence from Kant's Metaphysics of Morals is examined, in particular, the passages that discuss motives like malice. Kant's position about such motives seems to be ‘intrinsic Kantianism’: any action from malice is wrong. To make malice strongly wrong‐making in this way is implausible.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
