Abstract
We model heterogeneous bidders’ bidding decisions and derive equilibrium solutions under both discriminatory and uniform price auctions. Under the assumptions that bidders’ cost of funds is uniformly distributed, and the winning probability is a linear decreasing function of the quoted price, we show that a revenue maximizing issuer should consider bidders’ cost of funds and winning probability when choosing the optimal auction mechanism.
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