Trapped in the Net: The Unintended Consequences of Computerization

Abstract

Reviewed by: Trapped in the Net: The Unintended Consequences of Computerization * Bayla Singer (bio) Trapped in the Net: The Unintended Consequences of Computerization By Gene I. Rochlin. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. Pp. xvi+293; notes/references, bibliography, index. $35 (cloth); $17.95 (paper). Gene I. Rochlin supports his alarmist title with significant documentation of the degree to which computerization has been pursued in many fields without adequate attention to the needs of human users. His point is well taken, and it deserves attention by all those interested in technological innovation. Unfortunately, his statement “That our history has been shaped by the form and use of our tools in ways totally unanticipated by their inventors is, as always, conveniently forgotten” (p. 5) is reflexive; Rochlin sees computerization as a series of cases that are all unique in history. He considers [End Page 201] each instance of computerized distress to be without historical precedent in the velocity and intensity of its unthinking adoption. History is thus discarded as a potential source of understanding and of problem-solving approaches. Rochlin concentrates his focus on issues of safety and safeguards in the electric-utility, banking, air-traffic control, and military fields. Common denominators among these are the high degree of computerization and the importance of human factors such as speed of comprehension, communication difficulties, and gaps between cultures and generations. Rochlin has compiled data from several perspectives, including participant-observer studies, government investigations, popular and academic articles, and his own collection of anecdotal material. Rochlin, however, attributes to computerization much that should be more properly charged to other factors. For example, the account of a tragic misunderstanding between a Libyan airliner and two jet fighters of the Israeli Air Force (pp. 152–54) clearly notes that the Libyan pilots “consistently misread almost every signal they were given by Cairo or the Israeli fighters,” including warning shots, wagging wings, and close flybys that allowed visual identification of the fighters’ national markings. Yet the conclusion Rochlin draws is that the true culprit was the Israeli pilots’ “cognitive frame . . . predetermined by their own electronic command and control system.” The bibliography is extensive and includes many significant historical studies by magisterial figures in the history of technology. Rochlin correctly understands the influence of culture on the adoption of technologies, and he is careful to point out that resistance is not always a symptom of Luddism. He is also careful to remind us that computerization has provided many benefits not previously available. His reasoned conclusion, that designers and consumers should be in more direct communication with each other throughout the innovation process, is unimpeachable. It is regrettable that part of the material he offers in support of this conclusion is of dubious validity. Bayla Singer Dr. Singer is an independent scholar residing in Florida. Footnotes * Permission to reprint a review published here may be obtained only from the reviewer. Copyright © 1999 the Society for the History of Technology