Transparency Theory and its dynamic alternatives: Commentary on “Be Articulate”

Abstract

“Be Articulate: A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition Projection” is a remarkable paper in at least two respects: First, it is the only broadly Gricean treatment of presuppositions that generates precise and accurate predictions about the pattern of presupposition projection. Schlenker proposes that presuppositions arise as a result of a pragmatic prohibition against using one short construction to express two independent meanings. This basic idea is quite an old one. But no one has ever elaborated this pragmatic story in a way that yields a systematic theory of presupposition projection. Indeed, for many, the fact that pragmatic approaches to presupposition did not easily account for a wide range of projection behavior (most previous accounts contented themselves by treating projection out of negation) was a reason to be skeptical of such pragmatic approaches. Schlenker’s work puts this worry about Gricean accounts to rest. Second, Schlenker has shown how one can give an account of presupposition projection without stipulating properties of the logical connectives that not do not follow from their truth-conditional meaning along with other general features of the account. As far as I know, no previous, empirically adequate theory accomplished this. In this short commentary I will argue for two main points: The first point relates to the second aspect of Schlenker’s theory that I mentioned. Schlenker argues that Transparency Theory has an explanatory advantage over dynamic semantics because of its non-stipulative treatment of the different logical connectives. However, I argue that dynamic semantics can, in a very natural way, be modified to yield an explanatory theory that stipulates nothing about each binary connective besides its truth-conditions. So Transparency Theory does not stand alone in being able to make accurate predictions about presupposition projection without connective-specific stipulations. I am not all confident that dynamic approaches to presupposition projection are correct, but I am sure that they need not be stipulative in the way in which the theory of Heim (1983) is. Second, I will argue that Schlenker is right to give both symmetric and asymmetric theories of presupposition projection. However, I will point out that Schlenker’s symmetric theory of pre1See, for instance, Stalnaker (1974) and Grice (1981). 2In fact, since Schlenker’s work was first made publicly available at least two other theories that can predict the basic pattern of presupposition projection without connective-specific stipulations have emerged: Chemla (2008) treats presuppositions as a form of scalar implicature, while George (2008) revives the strong Kleene truth-tables to predict the basic pattern of presupposition projection. 3To my knowledge, Schlenker is right in suggesting that all subsequent work in the dynamic tradition has also imported stipulations akin to Heim’s to predict the pattern of presupposition projection.