Transnational Legal Spillover? A Re-Appraisal of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention

Abstract

Abstract Can prosecutions by US authorities help spread enforcement of foreign bribery laws to other countries? In this article, we explore this question by re-examining earlier scholarship that found that US prosecutions of foreign corporations under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) increase the likelihood that the corporation's home state will enforce its own foreign bribery laws. Using a conditional-frailty Cox model that allows us to model foreign bribery enforcement actions as repeat-events, we do not find evidence that FCPA prosecutions lead to sustained increases of foreign bribery enforcement by target countries. We also find that prior results are not robust to the inclusion of an important confounding variable: a country's level of exposure to corruption in their trading partners. Still, while our findings indicate a more limited role of US law enforcement in this area, we nonetheless see many promising avenues for future research on transnational law enforcement and its consequences.