Transnational constitutionalism – conflicts‐law constitutionalism – economic constitutionalism: the exemplary case of the European Union

Abstract

AbstractTransnational constitutionalism is both a sociological given and a legal challenge. We observe the emergence of ever more legally framed transnational arrangements with ever more power and impact. Do such arrangements deserve to be called legitimate rule in Habermasian terms? Is it at all conceivable that the proprium of law can be defended against the rise of its informal competitors? This article opts for a third way that listens to neither the siren songs on law beyond the state nor to the defences of nation‐state constitutionalism as the monopolist of legitimate rule. The proposed alternative suggests that transnational legal ordering of the European Union should build on its reconceptualization as a ‘three‐dimensional conflicts law’ with a democracy‐enhancing potential. This reconceptualization operationalizes the ‘united in diversity’ motto of the Draft Constitutional Treaty of 2004, preserves the essential accomplishments of Europe's constitutional democracies, provides for co‐operative problem solving of transnational regulatory tasks, and retains supervisory powers over national and transnational arrangements of private governance.