Abstract

Canada's response to 1956-1957 Hungarian refugee crisis has generally been treated by scholars as a highpoint in Canadian immigration history. In late October 1956, pro-democracy, anti-Soviet demonstrations directed at Soviet-backed government of Erno Gero broke out in Budapest. Fearing that its control of Warsaw Pact was unraveling, Kremlin ordered Red Army to put down revolution. On 4 November, events turned violent. Soviet forces clashed with protestors, prompting hundreds of thousands of Hungarians to flee across border into Austria and Yugoslavia. (2) For its part, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was unprepared to intervene militarily for fear of provoking a conflict with USSR. (3) NATO members were, however, able to relieve pressure placed on Austria. In days and weeks after invasion, Canadian immigration officials reinforced number of immigration officers at Canadian Embassy in Vienna, loosened normal requirements concerning proper travel documentation, medical exams, and security clearances, and enlisted commercial airplanes to transport refugees out of Austria. These initiatives produced impressive results: by end of 1957 more than 37,000 Hungarians had been accepted into Canada. But government actors were not solely responsible for this shift in policy; indeed, response was truly a national one and would not have been possible without support and assistance of a whole host of voluntary organizations from a wide range of sectors of Canadian society, all of which contributed greatly to resettlement (4) Most scholars of immigration, such as Gerald Dirks and Robert Key-serlingk, underline importance of reception of Hungarian refugees as having a liberalizing impact in immigration policy arena in Canada, serving as a useful precedent for other refugee migrations during times of crisis. (5) The Hungarian situation also had an immediate impact on operation of Canada's refugee program, as Freda Hawkins notes: ''Briefly, during Hungarian crisis and refugee movement, there was a glimpse of what better leadership and a much more co-operative approach to immigration in Canada might achieve. (6) N. F. Dreisziger makes a crucial distinction, however, by detailing not only cooperative efforts between Canadian government and welfare agencies, but also role of Hungarian Canadian community in refugee reception. (7) Forgetting Canadian contributions to resettlement of displaced persons in Europe following Second World War, Michael Lanphier describes Canadian response to Hungarian refugee crisis as the first ever crisis to demand Canada's participation in international resettlement effort. (8) It is also interesting to note that while some of above-mentioned scholars claim that decision to accept a significant number of refugees was reached only after pressure was exerted on policymakers from within and beyond federal government, they do not indicate either methods by which such pressure was applied or international characteristics of pressure itself The Canadian Council of Churches (CCC) was one of a number of voluntary organizations in Canada that offered assistance to refugees during Hungarian refugee crisis. (9) Like other domestic groups, it both assisted with material needs of Hungarians once they arrived in Canada, and lobbied Ottawa to include not just most able in its selection of refugees. But what separates CCC from other groups in Canada is larger transnational context in which that agency advocated on behalf of Hungarian refugees. Throughout period from 1956 to 1958, it worked closely with its sister council in Europe, World Council of Churches (WCC), which had direct contact with Hungarians. The WCC worked on an international level to achieve a more efficient and judicious handling of refugee crisis by lobbying governments, non-governmental organizations, and particularly its member groups, such as CCC. …

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