Transformation of representations on the normative content of morality in moral philosophy of the Early Modern Age

Abstract

The object of this research is the philosophical representations on the normative content of morality in their historical dynamics. Unlike its formal and functional characteristics that include objectivity, universality, priority with regards to other regulators of human behavior, the content of morality implies the general requirements and criteria for approval that form the image of a morally perfect individual and set the parameters of morally appropriate behavior. Although on the level of utmost generalizations, Western European idea of morality retains the normative content typical to the Judeo-Christian tradition; its instantiation constantly varies. The goal of this work consists in tracing the changes of such instantiation occurred in Western moral philosophy of the XVI – XVIII centuries (Early Modern Age). The indicated historical process is the subject of analysis. Research methodology suggests determination of the long-term trends in the history of normative ethics and their correlation with the socio-historical context. The analysis of sources on the topic demonstrates that understanding of ethical requirements and criteria for approval in understanding of moral philosophers of the Early Modern Age have experienced the following fundamental changes: 1)  displacement to periphery of the morality of responsibilities of moral figure before himself, 2) transition towards understanding of the good of other person through the prism of his wellbeing and opportunities for unhindered personal fulfillment, 3) emergence of correlation between responsibilities to other person and regards of his individual rights. In relation to the latter change, the three factors had crucial significance:  advancement of the idea of religious tolerance beyond the religious wars, countering the paternalistic custody by absolutist regimes, as well as the development of universal empathy based on the new forms of description of inner experience of a human. Although some conclusions acquired in evolution of the ideas of recent decades contradict to the explanation of the process of implementation of the individual rights into the moral legal discourse, which relies on the aforementioned three factors, it remains most promising according to the author.