Transformation from the top down: the United States Army, 1991–2012

Abstract

The US Army has been striving to transform its force structure and way of warfare since the 1991 Gulf War. These efforts over the past two decades are, however, but the latest of a number of reform initiatives the Army has undertaken since the end of the Second World War in order to fulfill its roles and missions in US national defense policy. The central mission for the Army through the four-and-a-half decades of the Cold War period was to provide a credible, forward-deployed deterrent force in Europe, and, if that deterrent failed, to prevail over Warsaw Pact forces in major combat. The Army’s last effort to transform itself during the Cold War was in the wake of Vietnam, when it implemented a range of internal changes and advanced technology acquisition programs to support its new AirLand Battle doctrine. The main focus of the Army in the various efforts to transform itself through the era of the Cold War was to create a force best suited to conduct major combat operations in Germany. The Army, along with the other US military services, through this period exploited and employed new technology to enhance its capabilities, and views advanced technology as a comparative combat advantage. The US Army that emerged from the Cold War thus was a techno-centric force that focused on being able to win in major combat operations. This US Army approach to warfare was seen as having been vindicated on the cusp of the ending of the Cold War by its success in the 1991 Gulf War.