Transformation from Real-Centredness to Other-Centredness: A Levinasian Re-Appraisal of John Hick’s Religious Pluralism

Xin Mao

doi:10.3390/rel9090255

Abstract

John Hick’s theory of religious pluralism has from its birth faced critiques regarding both its conceptual framework and its religious outlook; yet even so, his philosophy continues to challenge us to strive for a greater sense of openness and equality as regards other faiths that conflict with our own. The viability of Hick’s teaching today depends on a re-appraisal that enables it to surmount its theoretical difficulties. In this paper, we re-evaluate Hick’s philosophy of religion, focusing on the underlying ethical importance of his claim regarding soteriological transformation. Despite the problematic notion of the noumenal Real and its role in religious pluralism, the soteriological transformation claimed by Hick, which goes from self-centredness toward Real-centredness, reveals a commitment to self-opening and compassion towards the others. Yet we will argue that Hick only gives this ethical importance a secondary status in his philosophy of religion, which leaves open the question of the nature of the causality between the ultimate Reality and this ethical commitment. We thereby engage with the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, in search of an ethical dimension with a characteristic of infinity, which can offer religious pluralism a transcendent foundation without disregarding ethical primacy. Following Levinas, we will argue for a further transformation from reality-centredness towards other-centredness, by which messianic peace would take the place of ultimate Reality as the teleological value underpinning religious pluralism.

Highlights

The resurgence of interest in religious pluralism has brought John Hick’s philosophy back onto the horizon
Through shifting our attention from the notion of the ultimate Reality to the validity of the soteriological transformation, we argued that whereas the contradictory quality of the notion of the Real hinders the success of
Hick’s project on theoretical grounds, the ethical importance of the soteriological transformation offers potential for further development. We argued that this transformation offers the only valid ethical criterion, and by confirming the ethical criterion, we move to search for a further transformation toward other-centredness through introducing Emmanuel Levinas’s relevant discussions on religious experience, pluralism and messianic peace

Summary

Introduction

The resurgence of interest in religious pluralism has brought John Hick’s philosophy back onto the horizon. Hick’s theoretical framework has been the subject of numerous critiques, from philosophers and theologians alike (Heim 1995; D’Costa 1996; Rose 1997; McKim 2012; Sinkinson 2016) They primarily call into question the conceptualization of the ultimate reality and the possibility that it leads towards a real pluralism. 89), and his religious pluralist theory of transformation from self-centredness toward real-centredness has an ethical importance which extends beyond any theoretical questions regarding the notion of ultimate Reality. D’Costa raises questions about Hick’s theory concerning the universality of the soteriological transformation from self-centredness to reality-centredness, asking how this universalist and nonexclusive approach can be compatible with the violent nature of certain contemporary religious movements. We will argue that the further transformation toward otherness could give religious pluralism a primarily ethical meaning: instead of leading toward the ultimate Real, pluralism will be seen as bringing about a certain “messianic peace” (Levinas 1979, p. 22)

Other-Centredness and a Religious Pluralism of Messianic Peace

Conclusions