Abstract
The author challenges a strategy for transferable air discharge permits proposed by T.H. Tietenberg in 1980 on the grounds that parties other than existing or new sources of pollution can participate in a free market and effectively remove portions of the environment from further development. A party with sufficient financial resources to stockpile emission rights could be an environmentalist bent on improving air quality or an industrialist planning his own future expansion. Both would stifle industrial growth. Tietenberg responds by exploring how stockpiling affects allocation efficiency. Since industrial stockpiling will eventually produce revenues, he suggests denying market access to environmental groups. (DCK)
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