Transcending False Nonprofit Governance Dilemmas

Abstract

Demands for Broadened Accountability (BA) of nonprofit organizations require that boards achieve a high level of engagement to address important issues properly (Morrison & Salipante, 2007). This paper presents the theoretical basis for boards falling short of such engagement and specifies fundamental obstacles leaders face in achieving BA. One set of especially salient obstacles is conceptualized as false governance dilemmas. Two are considered in this paper: legitimacy vs. efficiency (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Deephouse, 1996; Morrison & Salipante, 2006) and conflict/monitoring vs. cooperation/collaboration. Two broadly defined relational practices – integrative bargaining (Walton & McKersie, 1965) and maintenance of high-trust/high-distrust relationships (Lewicki, MacAllister, & Bies, 1998) – are presented as mechanisms for establishing robust board engagement, transcending false governance dilemmas and achieving BA. The author suggests that a nonprofit paradox perspective (Cornforth, 2004) enables the gradual development of such practices, engagement, and accountability.