Transborder identities, bias, and third-party conflict management

Abstract

Which third parties are more likely to manage interstate conflicts? Once they do, what kind of conflict management methods do they use? I argue that ethnic, language, and/or religious ties between a potential third party and disputant states can affect both the likelihood and the type of conflict management. If there are strong identity ties (ethnic, language, and/or religious) between the majority group in a potential third-party state and the majority group in one of the disputant states, both the likelihood of conflict management in general and the likelihood of economic conflict management in particular should increase. Equally stronger identity ties between a potential third party and both disputants should also increase the likelihood of conflict management in which third parties use verbal and diplomatic conflict management methods since they do not harm any of the disputants. Empirical findings based on a dataset covering the militarized interstate disputes between 1946 and 2011 support my theoretical expectations. These findings contribute to the literature by exploring the role of transborder identities—in addition to material factors such as alliance, trade partnership, or joint regime type—in management of interstate conflicts by third parties.