Transatlantic Relations after the War in Iraq

Abstract

After the war in Iraq, there is a troubling difference between the internal and the external assessment of the state of transatlantic relations – that is to say, a difference between the perceptions of those involved in the transatlantic dynamic (Europeans and Americans) and those outside it. To most Americans and Europeans, the transatlantic bond has been badly damaged. Cooperation in some shape or form still appears possible on a number of issues, but even now, months after the end of hostilities, the stubborn insistence of the different actors to find their position on the war vindicated by events continues to poison the atmosphere. Worse, dangerous questions for NATO have now surfaced concerning the indivisibility of European and American security. More than ten years after the end of the Cold War, it seems that we now have more than different views on security between the U.S. and Europe; we have diverging interests and values. And, to some observers, the choice appears to be between an amicable separation or a nasty divorce. To measure the extent of the damage, it suffices to note that a senior British diplomat, Rodric Braithwaite, wrote in the May issue of Prospect: “The special relationship is now supported only by Prime Ministers, submariners, and code breakers.”1 By contrast, to many located someplace other than the North Atlantic littoral (broadly defined), such transatlantic disputes are not only senseless but worrisome. They are simply a luxury that rich and prosperous nations can afford – precisely as a luxury – that reveal a concealed contempt for the more difficult situation faced by a large part of the world (“the West and the rest”). Some Iraqis may currently be the most vocal in expressing this feeling openly: “Stop quarrelling and start rebuilding our country for good!” Already, in March, when a second resolution was discussed, the non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council made it clear that they did not see any reason to take a firm stand on the issue, since the major powers, and in particular Western nations, could not agree among themselves. Later on, India also expressed dismay at the sharp division among the world’s democratic nations. At a time when New Delhi was striving to shed the post-colonial mindset in order to adopt a more proactive and responsible foreign policy, the transatlantic inability to agree on the way to enforce a Security Council resolution was disturbing. One is hardly surprised by such reactions. It was not dignified to undertake diplomatic campaigns for Security Council votes in countries like Guinea, Cameroon, Angola, and Chile. Among allies, it should have been possible to reach at least one of the two far better following outcomes: either col-