Abstract

Abstract Consumers often stockpile goods to store for future consumption. The existing theoretical literature has focussed on a price-based explanation where stockpiling arises due to temporary price reductions. In contrast, this paper explores a transaction-cost-based explanation where consumers stockpile to avoid the need to incur future transaction costs. It shows how transaction costs lead to positive consumer stockpiling in an oligopoly equilibrium even when future prices are expected to fall. Relative to a no-stockpiling benchmark, such stockpiling lowers profits, but improves consumer and total welfare. Our results extend to the case of quantity discounts where stockpiling consumers pay relatively lower per-unit prices than non-stockpiling consumers, when purchasing multi-unit bundles.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.