Abstract
The essay examines the networks that facilitate the transport of nuclear materials from the source to their possible purchasers. Analyzing the role of prisons in criminal operations, the interaction of criminals and terrorists, and the character of new organized crime groups, the author concludes that some of the most serious nuclear smuggling is not random or opportunistic. Rather, the most serious trafficking is rarely detected because it is run by professionals whose well established smuggling networks, facilitated by corruption, have the capacity to move significant quantities of diverse contraband without apprehension. Technical solutions to address this problem are not sufficient because detectors cannot identify well guarded HEU. Rather, much more attention needs to be paid to the crime and terror networks that can facilitate this trade.
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