Trading strategies of energy storage participation in day-ahead joint market based on Stackelberg game

Abstract

The goal of "carbon peak, carbon neutral" and the increasing expansion of new energy have helped to advance the development of energy storage. However, since the operating cost of energy storage is high, carbon emission trading and power market trading have emerged, effectively improving the efficiency. In this paper, a trading strategy and bidding framework of energy storage participation in the day-ahead joint market are studied. A market bidding model has been established in a framework based on the Stackelberg game. Finally, the "Day-Ahead and Intra-Day and Carbon Emission Trading (CET)" market clearing model has been constructed. It has been simplified to solve the equivalent mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem with equilibrium constraints through the use of the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) optimality criterion and duality principle. The proposed model is validated through improved examples to obtain thermal unit output cuts of up to 32.2% during load trough periods, and up to 16.75% increase in clearing prices during peak load periods. The storage life is extended and the storage output variation is minimized.