Abstract
AbstractAs emerging powers rise and established powers decline, international institutions come under pressure to adjust to new power realities. When and how do international institutions adapt to underlying global power shifts? We propose an (institutionalist) theory of strategic co-optation that differs from both (realist) accommodationist and (liberal) integrationist theories. Drawing on isolated treatments of strategic co-optation from other domains – domestic and international, autocratic and democratic, past and present – we develop a theory of strategic co-optation as a mode of institutional adaption to shifts in the global distribution of power. The theory specifies the concept, the conditions and the (unintended) consequences of strategic co-optation. We conceptualize co-optation as a specific form of adaptation where established powers trade institutional privileges for emerging powers' institutional support. We theorize the conditions under which emerging and established powers are (more or less) likely to strike a co-optation deal. In addition, we identify endogenous dynamics that may render co-optation precarious and thus subject to instabilities. While the ambition of this paper is primarily theoretical, we provide various empirical illustrations of how strategic co-optation is used to adapt international institutions to contemporary shifts in the global distribution of power.
Highlights
Contending approaches to global power shifts As emerging powers such as China and India rise and established powers such as the USA and the UK decline, international institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB) come under pressure to adapt to shifts in the global distribution of power
Many power shift theories (PSTs) contributions that draw on liberal traditions in International Relations (IR) argue, by contrast, that emerging powers will seek their integration into the current order and its institutions rather than asking for far-reaching institutional adjustments
Co-optation is a combination of accommodation and integration, and we find occasional references to ‘co-optation’ in both accommodationist and integrationist PST contributions (Stephen 2012, 296–298; Acharya 2014, 154; Paul 2016, 18; Newman and Zala 2018, 871)
Summary
Many co-optation accounts regard a fundamental challenge to the order and its institutions as an important condition for strategic co-optation – some even consider it a defining feature (Selznick 1964; Dickson 2000; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). (1) Authority vs governance challenge: Co-optors may draw on co-optation to cope with challenges to their authority This is the focus of the literature on co-optation in modern autocracies (Wintrobe 1998; Dickson 2000; Gerschewski 2013, 2019; Hale 2015; Geddes et al 2018). It shows, for instance, that autocratic regimes use parliamentary assemblies to tame the opposition to their authority by giving opposition leaders the institutional privilege of parliamentary membership (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Co-optors might be prepared to offer institutional privileges
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
