Trading on extinction: An open-access deterrence model for the South African abalone fishery

Douglas J Crookes

doi:10.17159/sajs.2016/20150237

Abstract

South African rhinoceros (e.g. Diceros bicornis) and abalone (Haliotis midae) have in common that they both are harvested under open-access conditions, are high-value commodities and are traded illegally. The difference is that a legal market for abalone already exists. An open-access deterrence model was developed for South African abalone, using Table Mountain National Park as a case study. It was found that illegal poaching spiked following the closure of the recreational fishery. The resource custodian’s objective is to maximise returns from confiscations. This study showed that a legal trade results in a ‘trading on extinction’ resource trap, with a race for profits, an increase in the probability of detection after a poaching event and the depletion of populations. In contrast with HS Gordon’s seminal article (J Polit Econ 1954;62:124–142), profit maximisation does not automatically improve the sustainability of the resource. Under certain conditions (e.g. a legal trade with costly enforcement), profit maximisation may actually deplete abalone populations. The article also has implications for rhino populations, as a legal trade is currently proposed.

Highlights

The South African abalone (Haliotis midae) fishery is experiencing a crisis
In 2005, Operation Neptune and Operation Trident ended, as did the Environmental Courts. These initiatives were in the Overberg, poaching in the Table Mountain National Park doubled from 27.5 tonnes to 68.7 tonnes (Table 2)
They found that, a legalisation of the trade increased the profitability of game farms significantly compared with a no-trade scenario, profits were higher under a policy outcome that resulted in the local extinction of the rhino population compared with profits under a sustainable supply of rhino

Summary

Introduction

The South African abalone (Haliotis midae) fishery is experiencing a crisis. Illegal harvesting of abalone has escalated dramatically in recent years, to such an extent that the fishery was closed between 2008 and 2010.1 Several reasons for this escalation have been presented. Raemaekers et al.[2] argue that both the rise in abalone prices in the 1990s and the failure to include traditional fishers in the reform process, were drivers for the collapse in the fishery. The abalone fishery has a number of important features that characterise systems of illegal exploitation. The fishery is characterised by a complex system.[2] This characterisation requires some form of integrated modelling to develop the biological dynamics of the abalone population, and the dynamics of fishing effort

Results

Discussion

Conclusion