Abstract

We analyze the effects of trading disclosure requirements in markets with insider traders and professional investors. The insiders garble their trading throughout a mixed strategy. A number of differentially informed professional investors acquire information and contribute to increased mar- ket efficiency. A “reform” introducing post-trade transparency leads these professional investors to acquire less information and, then, to trade less, contributing to less price discovery. This information crowding-out may be so strong to neutralize the generally positive effects related to public disclosure or to harm market quality, resulting in diminished liquidity and informationally less efficient market.

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