Abstract

In this note we study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources in environments in which monetary transfers are not allowed. We allow each discrete resource to be represented by several copies, extend onto this environment the trading cycles mechanisms of Pycia and Unver [2009], and show that the extended mechanisms are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. In particular, we construct the counterpart of Papai [2000] hiererachical exchange mechanisms for environments with copies.

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